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A Program for the Next ICC
Prosecutor
Alex Whiting 1
As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins the process of
selecting the next Prosecutor, it finds itself at a critical moment. Few
people believe that the institution has lived up to expectations. The
court has brought relatively few cases, and many have not succeeded. 2
While convictions were achieved in the Lubanga, Ntaganda, Katanga,
and Al Mahdi cases, as well as in the obstruction of justice cases arising
out of the Bemba prosecution, many other cases failed at the
confirmation stage, during or after trial, or on appeal. 3 he future looks
grim. Presently, there is just one case at trial (Ongwen) and only three
in the pipeline (Al Hassan, Yekatom, and Ngäissona). 4 Many accused
remain at large, and some of the investigations being undertaken by
the Prosecutor (Georgia, Burundi, Afghanistan?) appear to offer little
prospect of producing actual cases in The Hague. 5 As the UK Foreign
Office stated at the ICC Assembly of States Parties in December 2018,
The statistics are sobering. After 20 years, and 1.5 billion Euros
spent we have only three [now four] core crime convictions. As
others have said, and I quote “it is undeniable that the Rome
project still falls short of the expectations of the participants at
that ground-breaking conference in Rome”. The time has come
for States to take a fundamental look at how the Court is
operating. We need to work together to address the challenges,
1.

Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School; Co-chair of the Editorial
Committee of the Journal of International Criminal Justice.

2.

Jane Stromseth, Is the ICC Making a Difference?, JUST SECURITY (Dec.
6, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/47717/icc-making-difference/
[https://perma.cc/3RV3-7VSJ].

3.

See Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3MK2-T3T4].

4.

Id.

5.

See ICC Prosecutor Calls for Afghanistan War Crimes Investigation,
NPR (Nov. 3, 2017, 5:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/11/03/561842662/icc-prosecutor-calls-for-afghanistan-warcrimes-investigation [https://perma.cc/AJ8B-ZQBE]; Nika Jeiranashvili,
Georgia – A Unique Case For The ICC, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Mar. 8.
2017), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/03/georgia-a-unique-case-for-theicc/ [https://perma.cc/YQ7J-SC2M]; Toby Sterling & Katharine
Houreld, Burundi Rejects International Criminal Court War Crimes
(Nov.
10,
2017),
Investigation,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-burundi/burundi-rejectsinternational-criminal-court-war-crimes-investigation-idUSKBN1DA1IH
[https://perma.cc/K6BJ-WGUX].
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for the future health of the Court, a Court that we care about
deeply. 6

What are these challenges? In the early years, and particularly at
the moment of change in 2012 from the first Prosecutor to the second, 7
it might have seemed that they largely concerned issues of personnel,
management, and policy. Now that the Court is nearly through its
second prosecutor 8, however, it is also clear that there exist problems
of institutional design. The next Prosecutor will need to chart a path
that meets these challenges – mindful that there is no realistic option
to revise the Rome Statute – and find a way to achieve success for the
institution, however that ends up being defined. The aim of this
articlewill be to analyze the challenges currently facing the ICC and
propose a three-part program for the next Prosecutor. Although the
ICC is a relatively young institution, it may not get many more chances
to get it right. If the next Prosecutor fails, the institution may never
recover.
Much of what has been written about the ICC’s problems, and how
to fix them, has focused on quality and efficiency. 9 The first Prosecutor
was initially credited for building up the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
and putting the court on the map by moving quickly to bring cases.10
But later, he was excoriated for bringing thinly investigated cases that
failed when brought to court. 11 The second Prosecutor committed the
6.

Andrew Murdoch, Legal Dir. to the Int’l Criminal Ct. Assembly of States
Parties, UK Statement to ICC Assembly of States Parties at its 17th
session
in
The
Hague,
(Dec.
5,
2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-iccassembly-of-states-parties-17th-session [https://perma.cc/2JFU-DL9V].

7.

Colum Lynch, Bensouda to Replace Moreno-Ocampo as ICC Prosecutor,
POLICY
(Nov.
30,
2011,
11:11
PM),
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/30/bensouda-to-replace-morenoocampo-as-icc-prosecutor/ [https://perma.cc/HW66-QJ2E].

8.

See The ICC Prosecutor Elections 2020, COALITION FOR THE INT’L
CT.
(Aug
7,
2019),
CRIMINAL
http://coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190807/icc-prosecutor-election-2020
[https://perma.cc/V9DR-Y5NX].

9.

See, e.g., Int’l Bar Ass’n, Enhancing Efficiency and Effectiveness of ICC
Proceedings: A Work in Progress 8 (Jan. 2011).

10.

Karen L. Corrie, International Criminal Law, 46 INT’L LAW 145, 151
(2012) (“While often a lightning rod for criticism, Moreno-Ocampo has
successfully established a well-functioning structure for the OTP, and
pushed it to be efficient and proactive.”); Kirsten Ainley, The
International Criminal Court on Trial, 24 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF.
309, 318 (2011) (“[T]he [p]rosecutor . . . . at the ICC [has] shown real
courage in [his] initial actions.”).

11.

Janet H. Anderson, Ocampo’s Shadow Still Hangs over the ICC, INT’L
JUST.
TRIB.
(June
18,
2018),
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office to a more cautious and deliberate approach and pledged to mount
more open-ended investigations and to bring cases only when they were
thoroughly investigated and essentially ready for trial. 12 While not all
of the cases have succeeded during the second Prosecutor’s tenure, there
has been an improvement in the strength of the cases. 13 But one cost is
that the OTP has brought many fewer cases overall, creating the risk
of empty courtrooms in the future. 14 Commentators continue to urge
the prosecution to bring stronger cases and to work more efficiently.15
These remedies are echoed on the side of the judges: more attention is
being paid to the selection process for judges, and under the direction
of President Fernandez, the judges undertook efforts to render their
practices more efficient, particularly in the pre-trial phase. 16
While there certainly continues to be room to improve the quality
and efficiency of the ICC’s investigations, prosecutions, and
https://www.justicetribune.com/blog/ocampos-shadow-still-hangs-overicc [https://perma.cc/947N-5TVA].
12.

Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Announces Important Changes in New
SECURITY
(Oct.
24,
2013),
Strategic
Plan,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/2215/icc-prosecutor-announces-importantstrategic-plan/ [https://perma.cc/84L7-T6RW].

13.

See Alex Whiting, The ICC’s Afghanistan Decision: Bending to U.S. or
Focusing Court on Successful Investigations?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 12,
2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63613/the-iccs-afghanistan-decisionbending-to-u-s-or-focusing-court-on-successful-investigations/
[https://perma.cc/3HRJ-875W].

14.

Alex Whiting, Difficult Days Ahead for the International Criminal Court,
SECURITY
(Dec.
19,
2016),
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/35627/difficult-days-icc/
[https://perma.cc/GW3C-H6Y4].

15.

See, e.g., Bemba Judgment Warrants Better Investigations and Fair
Trials – Not Efforts to Discredit the Decision, AMNESTY INT’L, (June 19,
2018),
https://hrij.amnesty.nl/bemba-verdict-warrants-betterinvestigations-and-fair-trials/ [https://perma.cc/4ADE-XB82]; Patryk
Labuda, The ICC’s ‘Evidence Problem,’ The Future of International
Criminal Investigations after the Gbagbo Acquittal, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-iccs-evidence-problem/
[https://perma.cc/J3AP-7ADH]; Richard Dicker, The Court is Now More
(June
28,
2018),
Important
than
Ever,
ICC
FORUM
https://iccforum.com/anniversary
[https://perma.cc/JX7E-5NGN]
(“The Office has worked to draw lessons from missteps and implement
better investigative and proofing practices, but it’s a long road to go.”).

16.

See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Strengthen the International Criminal Court,
HOUSE
(June
12,
2019),
CHATHAM
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/strengtheninternational-criminal-court
[https://perma.cc/3V6E-UU2L];
Press
Release, Int’l Criminal Ct., ICC Judges Agree on Measures to Improve
Efficiency of Criminal Process (June 22, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1121&ln=en [https://perma.cc/HD5BDSKD].
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adjudications, there is a growing recognition that the court also faces
institutional design challenges. 17 The single conflict tribunals for
Nuremberg, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and
Cambodia have all been, to greater or lesser degrees, successful, if
success is defined as effectively bringing a range of cases to capture the
range of criminality that occurred during the conflict at issue. 18 But
scaling up this model to a global court has severely tested the design.19
While the range of potential activities of the court have dramatically
increased, the authority and budget of the court have remained the
same, 20 and the political support for the institution has waned and been
diluted across a broad range of activities. 21
The result is that the ICC is constructed on a series of fault lines.
On the one hand, its scope of potential activities is vast. Its jurisdiction
is expansive, covering the territory of 122 States Parties, the actions of
non-States Parties within the borders of those States Parties, and any
situations referred to the court by the UN Security Council.22
17.

See e.g., Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I- This is Not Fine: The International
Criminal Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-internationalcriminal-court-in-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/F4JX-6VPD].

18.

See Mohammad Rabiul Islam, The International Criminal Court: Its
Success and Limitations for Pursuing International Justice, 5 J. CIV. &
LEGAL SERV. 2 (2016); Carolyn Kenney & John Norris, International
Justice on Trial?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 8–28 (Mar. 2018),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/03/26112219/I
nternationalJustice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3H9-NYYX].

19.

See Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice-President of the Int’l Criminal
Court, Keynote Address at the Salzburg Law School on International
Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court - Current Challenges
and
Perspectives
(Aug.
8,
2011),
https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a8543b7d0a4b9f06/283740/010911salzburglawschool.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TAM8-HYJZ].

20.

Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources does the International
Criminal Court Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017).

21.

See Facing Political Attacks, Limited Budget, International Criminal
Court Needs Strong Backing to Ensure Justice for Atrocity Crimes,
President
tells
General
Assembly, U.N. (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12084.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/W289-SAPG].

22.

The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL CT.,
https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties
%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/3E3F-WSG5];
Understanding the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIMINAL CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6Q8-X2J9].

482

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
A Program for the Next ICC Prosecutor

Accordingly, the court presently has eleven investigations open, though
several are now largely inactive. 23 While the court has jurisdiction over
just four crimes 24, it can prosecute a wide range of acts within the
context of an armed conflict. 25 Additionally, crimes against humanity
havebeen expansively defined, as illustrated by the broad range of cases
brought by the court, from the massive killings in Sudan, to the more
narrow and temporally contained post-election violence in Kenya and
Côte d’Ivoire. 26 Further, the Rome Statute requires the Prosecutor to
investigate whenever there are grounds to do so. 27 Finally, the modes
of liability under Articles 25 and 28 reach a broad range of conduct and
actors: essentially any person who intentionally participates in, or
contributes to, a crime within the jurisdiction of the court may be
liable. 28 Thus, the jurisdiction, law, and procedure of the ICC all push
the court towards a broad range of investigations across the globe.
At the same time, the investigative and prosecutorial tools of the
court are limited, 29 the budget is constrained, 30 the court’s procedures
are onerous, 31 and the human resources policies stultifying. 32 The model
of the ad-hoc tribunals, and the track record of the early years of the
ICC, strongly indicate that the international criminal justice project
succeeds best when there is focus, when a tribunal can concentrate on
its investigations into a conflict for a sustained period. The scope of the
ICC’s activities, however, renders such focus difficult, if not impossible.
Moreover, while the prosecutor is “independent” in the sense of
being able to decide on cases and priorities on her own, the OTP lacks
any real independent authority or power to fulfill its mission. 33 It is
23.

Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icccpi.int/pages/situation.aspx [https://perma.cc/D7AX-Y7GZ].

24.

How the Court Works, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icccpi.int/about/how-the-court-works [https://perma.cc/HMD9-HVJ9].

25.

See id.

26.

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES
AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES (2011).

27.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].

28.

Id. art. 25–28.

29.

See id. art. 53–61.

30.

See id. art. 113–18.

31.

See id. art. 62–85.

32.

See id. art. 34–52.

33.

See Anthony Wang, On the Failed Authority of the International Criminal
POL’Y
DIG.
(June
15,
Court,
INT’L
2018), https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-failed-authority-ofthe-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/6R27-6HJ3].
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entirely dependent on state cooperation, and to a lesser extent the
cooperation of non-governmental organizations and international
institutions, to conduct its business. 34 And this cooperation is not a onetime given affair; it has to remain constant throughout the preliminary
examination, investigation, prosecution, and ultimate adjudication. The
ICC has already experienced the devastating effects of cooperation, or
political support, first being turned on and then later turned off (see
Sudan, Kenya, Libya, etc.). 35
And so here exist additional fault lines within the structure of the
court. The ICC’s central aim is to investigate and prosecute structures
of authority, whether state or non-state actors, but it is dependent on
structures of authority to do so. 36 Moreover, pursuant to the
complementarity principle, the ICC only has jurisdiction if the national
jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute the
crimes itself, but when the ICC gains jurisdiction, it usually has to rely
on these very same national authorities, the ones that could not or
would not investigate the crimes, to conduct its investigations. 37 The
single conflict tribunals largely succeeded in slipping by these tensions
because of their focus, longevity, and support from outside actors.38
These fixes are less available in a global court. The court’s limited
budget only exacerbates the problem, thinning the resources available
to confront each situation.
Further, as compared to the ad-hoc tribunals, the procedures of the
ICC are more demanding. 39 To be sure, as a criminal court, it is
necessary that the ICC’s processes be rigorous and fully protective of
defendants’ rights. At the end of the day, the prosecution is required
to prove individual criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt,
and a criticism of Nuremberg, and to some extent the early days of the
ad-hoc tribunals, has been that at times these procedures were

34.

See id.; see Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations and the
International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law,
39 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 243, 244–45 (2006).

35.

See Alana Tiemessen, The International Criminal Court and the Politics
of Prosecutions, 18 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 444 (2014).

36.

Alex Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives at the ICC, in
THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: PROMISE AND CONSTRAINTS 128, 131
(Martha Minow ed., 2015) [hereinafter Whiting, Investigations and
Institutional Imperatives].

37.

See Understanding the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T83Q-VLET].

38.

Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives, supra note 36, at
129–30.

39.

Id. at 130.
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deficient 40. Nonetheless, the particular procedures at the ICC are
distinctly and remarkably layered, extensive, prolonged, and onerous.
Beyond providing the accused a fair chance to defend himself or herself,
they extend the proceedings (allowing opportunities for focus and
support to dissipate), create excessive opportunities to re-open and
revisit questions of fact and law, and absorb valuable resources. 41
Finally, prosecutors, judges, and academics often pay little
attention to human resource concerns, but the “permanence” of the
ICC may have also subtly, but importantly, changed the workforce
there. Everyone who went to the single conflict ad-hoc tribunals knew
that their time at the institution was limited, which for the most part
created a sense of urgency and helped maintain focus. 42 The ICC is
largely staffed, however, by long-term and even permanent personnel, 43
making it hard to sustain energy and intensity, challenge established
practices, or introduce new ideas and approaches.
There are two frequent responses to these institutional design
challenges. One is to acknowledge and then ignore them, imagining that
they can simply be willed away. Within this approach we see two kinds
of appeals. First, appeals to the court just to do better: find better
evidence, bring stronger cases, find non-witness evidence, make better
choices and decisions, work more efficiently, and so on. 44 Second,
appealsto states to step up: by increasing the court’s budget and
providing greater cooperation and political support. 45 These appeals are
necessary and important, and there is without question room to do
40.

See Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous
Precedent,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
1946),
available
at
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-afair-trial-a-dangerous-precedent/306492/
[https://perma.cc/4XECV5RN].

41.

See Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives, supra note 36,
at 139–40.

42.

See generally Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Stresses
Importance, Urgency, of Restoring Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies,
U.N. Press Release SC/8209 (Oct. 6, 2004).

43.

CRIM.
CT.,
See
About,
INT’L
[https://perma.cc/MA7B-ZJPB].

44.

See, e.g., Stef Blok, The International Criminal Court Must Do Better.
Reforms are Urgently Needed, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/02/internationalcriminal-court-must-do-better-reforms-are-urgently-needed/
[https://perma.cc/9G4J-LENG].

45.

See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Facing Political Attacks,
Limited Budget, International Criminal Court Needs Strong Backing to
Ensure Justice for Atrocity Crimes, President Tells General Assembly,
U.N. Press Release GA/12084 (Oct. 29, 2018) (describing the President
of the ICC’s request for support from U.N. General Assembly).
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better and more, but at some point, they run into the realities of the
court’s structure and design. No amount of hard work or hoping for
greater cooperation will solve the tensions that are built into the court’s
foundation.
The second response is to reconceptualize what the court is and to
focus less on the ICC as a “court” and more on its role as a beacon or
model or symbol or spur for others to act. 46 Here is where it becomes a
success simply to begin an investigation (see, e.g., some of the
commentary on the Afghanistan situation) because it shines a spotlight
and calls out impunity. 47 Here too is where the endlessly discussed, and
pursued, notion of complementarity comes into play. 48 Maybe the ICC
cannot do much itself, but that is ok because it will incentivize states
to act and prosecute cases themselves (even though the premise of the
ICC’s jurisdiction is that the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute
itself49). There is a narrow truth to both of these notions – the court as
symbol, and the dynamics of complementarity – but at bottom they
are limited by their dependence on the court first succeeding as a court.
The symbolic force of opening an investigation, or the ability to
motivate states to bring cases themselves, will dissipate and disappear
if the court proves itself unable to deliver on its core mission. The
court’s force lies in prosecutions and convictions, not in announcements
and pronouncements.
What then to do? Rather than ignoring or sidestepping the court’s
fundamental design, and the flaws of that design, the new Prosecutor
should devise a plan to succeed within its present constraints with a
three-part program to (1) bring more (and smaller) cases, (2) focus the
work of the court on situations where prosecutions are possible, and (3)
work with the other organs to amend the procedures and HR policies
of the institution.
By far, the most important objective of the next Prosecutor should
be to bring more cases. Many more cases. The ICC must prove that it
can succeed at its core mission before it can do anything else, and the
force of the court, moral or legal or political, will depend on proving
that it can successfully prosecute cases. While there will be a
temptation to bring in an outsider to be the next Prosecutor – to shake
up the court and change direction – that would be a mistake if it ended
46.

See Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., International Criminal Court Marks
Opening of the Judicial Year 2019, ICC-CPI-20190118-PR1430 (Jan. 18,
2019)
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1430
[https://perma.cc/TP7Y-X92U].

47.

See Karen Allen, ICC Throws Spotlight on African Injustice, BBC (Dec.
16,
2010),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12003954
[https://perma.cc/ES6D-2RBH].

48.

Sarah M. H. Nouwen, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE
CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA
AND SUDAN 8 (2013).

49.

See Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 37.
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up being someone with no experience in building actual cases in an
international tribunal. It is the Prosecutor who drives the OTP, and
the next Prosecutor will have to be single-minded about bringing cases
forward. He or she should ensure that every activity of the OTP is
oriented towards that goal; only a chief Prosecutor who understands
the ins and outs of international criminal investigations will know how
to drive the institution to that objective, overcoming inertias and
entrenched practices along the way.
And in order to bring more cases, the Prosecutor should shift the
orientation of the office towards smaller cases. Already, in its last
Strategic Plan, the OTP allowed for the possibility of charging lowerlevel cases 50, but the new Prosecutor should embrace this option more
fully and make it the norm. This approach will be controversial and a
break in established practice; every single international criminal
tribunal since Nuremberg has focused on prosecuting those most
responsible. 51 While that mandate is not explicitly set forth in the Rome
Statute, 52 it has been embraced as a goal of the OTP by both the first
and second Prosecutors. 53 And if the office brings smaller cases, it is
certain that it will receive criticism. 54 Commentators will complain that
these prosecutions are unfair, that they are not strategic, and that the
institution is squandering its resources. 55 But the ICC’s design
challenges mean it will be able to bring cases against high-level accused
in the first instance only in rare circumstances. 56 If the OTP wants
cases, and particularly if it wants a lot of cases, the Prosecutor will
have to embrace bringing smaller prosecutions. In most cases the choice
will not be, at least as an initial matter, between high-level cases and
lower-level ones, but rather between lower-level ones and no cases at
all.
50.

Alex Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals Important Strategy Shift in New
SECURITY
(May
17,
2019),
Policy
Document,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/64153/icc-prosecutor-signals-importantstrategy-shift-in-new-policy-document/ [https://perma.cc/QG6R-6VMC]
[hereinafter Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals].

51.

Id.

52.

See Rome Statute, supra note 27.

53.

See ICC Situations and Cases, COALITION INT’L CRIM.
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/icc-situations-and-cases
[https://perma.cc/7GV6-JTS8].

54.

Cf. Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal
Court Cannot Win, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 323 (2015) (discussing how, no
matter what position the ICC takes, it will receive criticism for being
either too aligned with state interests, “apologist”, or not aligned with
state interests enough, “utopian”) .

55.

See id. at 336.

56.

See Whiting, ICC Prosecutor Signals, supra note 50.
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To date, the Prosecution has only brought a few cases a year and
at times has had only a single trial ongoing. 57 If it focuses on smaller
cases, there is the potential to bring many more cases at the same time
which could fundamentally alter the functioning of the court in positive
ways. First, it will give the court an opportunity to show that it can
function in its core mission. It is difficult to imagine the court
succeeding in any other respect if it cannot succeed there. Second, a
busy court will force all of the actors at the court – the prosecution,
registry, judges, and even the defense – to become more efficient and
practical. When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia became busier, it found ways to conduct the trials more
efficiently without a loss in effectiveness or fairness. 58 Third,
prosecutions of lower-level cases will create political pressure, within
the situation country and internationally, to pursue higher-level
perpetrators, which could open up avenues of cooperation that could
advance such cases. Put another way, a central complaint against the
pursuit of lower-level cases will be that it is unfair; one way to address
this unfairness will be to go after the more senior actors. Moreover,
prosecutions of the smaller cases could produce evidence and witnesses
allowing for stronger prosecutions of higher-level officials. Fourth,
prosecutions of core acts of criminality will pave the way for national
prosecutors within the state and in other states to bring forward their
own cases (based either on local or on universal jurisdiction). In sum,
prosecuting a multitude of cases will energize and legitimize the court,
help it function effectively and efficiently, and galvanize support for
justice more broadly.
As a second objective, the new Prosecutor should focus the work of
the office on those situations that are likely to generate actual cases.
This is tricky because it is not always predictable; both the
investigations into atrocities and the political circumstances allowing
for arrests can unfold in unpredictable ways. Many of the surrenders or
arrests of high-level actors occurred in cases that seemed, at their
beginning, almost hopeless. 59 Moreover, at times it may be necessary to
open an investigation into a situation where fruitful investigations are
impossible simply as a placeholder for future possible action. But to say
that investigations can unfold in unpredictable ways is not the same as
saying that the outcomes of investigations are completely unpredictable.
And the need for the institution to focus its investigative efforts requires
it to make choices. The only way to make those choices are to
57.

See Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International
Crimes in National Courts, 90 INDIANA L. J. 829, 839 (2015).

58.

See Alex Whiting, The ICTY as a Laboratory of International Criminal
Procedure, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011).

59.

See Whiting, Investigations and Institutional Imperatives, supra note 36,
at 129.
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concentrate on the gravest situations and the ones where actual cases
appear to be a likely, or at least a possible, outcome.
Third, in addition to taking steps to improve the quality of the
OTP’s investigations, the Prosecutor should consider what institutional
design elements are within his or her control and could be adjusted.
Many aspects of the design cannot be changed. It is not likely that the
budget of the ICC will be dramatically increased, or that states will
suddenly make cooperation with the court a priority above all others.
However, within the court, the Prosecutor could consider ways to
improve the cumbersome procedures at the court, working with the
judges to produce more sensible approaches to some of the key stages
of the proceedings. 60 At a minimum, the Prosecutor should look for
opportunities to propose more streamlined processes. Moreover, the
Prosecutor should focus on the office’s human resources policies and
consider ways to encourage some turnover to allow for fresh energy and
new ideas. The office could adopt presumptive term limits for certain
positions, limit internal promotions, and consider other measures that
would encourage staff to consider moving to other institutions after a
stint at the court. None of these steps will fundamentally alter the
character of the court, but they could help bring its design more in line
with its mission.
The current challenges of the court are existential. To survive, it
will be essential for the court to prove that it can succeed in its core
mission of prosecuting cases. That will require a shift to prosecuting
smaller cases and focusing the work of the court. This will be a
departure from the approach of the ICC and the other international
tribunals that preceded it, but in fact a return to the essence of what
the court is.

60.

See Leila Nadya Sadat, Politics, Procedure, and Law: Three Continuing
Challenges for the ICC in its Third Decade, ICC FORUM (June 28, 2018),
https://iccforum.com/anniversary#Sadat
[https://perma.cc/86JPNAX3].
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